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Stewarding Treason: Political Instability in Amis and Amiloun
Maia Farrar
University of Michigan
When the unnamed steward in the medieval romance Amis and Amiloun attempts

to join the knights’ brotherhood and prevent Amis from defiling the duke’s daughter, he is simultaneously lauded for his fidelity and reviled as a “fals feloun.” Medieval stewards are defined by their status as assistants to the king’s interests, and
yet if the narrative or scholarship remember him at all, it is as the stereotypical
“fals steward” who betrays his post. This article considers the implications to the
political body when the “traitor” has a superior legal political standing than the
protagonist(s). The work legitimizes the traitor by granting him moral and political supremacy while leaving the heroes’ power unconstrained. Amis’s validation
and condemnation of multiple avenues for authority inadvertently diversifies the
political landscape, which ultimately questions the delineation of the political
community. I contend, therefore, that political power occupies a dispersed and
conflicted network.

The ideology of chivalry, exemplified in the literature of the thir-

teenth and fourteenth century, imbued the aristocracy with ideals
of “prowess, loyalty, largess, and courtesy” which shaped and gave
structure to the political vocabulary.1 In the historical and literary
structure of the court, chivalric values—“true” knighthood, amorous loyalty and displays of prowess—all helped create a shared
identity amongst the governing class. But it also relied on the performance of a shared masculine or homosocial bond. This homosocial community therefore structured the systems of cultural power
by establishing legitimate modes of interpersonal interaction and
evaluation—but also forged the bonds of the political community.
Treason was defined importantly by not only a crime or transgres1 Maurice Keen identifies chivalry as variously defined as an order of knighthood, as an
estate or social class, or as a code of values—idealizing “prowess, loyalty, largess, courtesy, and franchise (free and frank bearing that is visible testimony to the combination of
good birth with virtue)”(2). As Stephen Jaeger outlines, “courtliness” and the flowering
of literature of the twelfth century was aimed at “taming the reckless assertiveness if the
European feudal nobility, at limiting its freedom in manners and morals, at restraining
individual willfulness, and at raising this class…imbuing it with ideals of modesty, humanity, elegance, restraint, moderation, affability, and respectfulness.” These ideals and ethical ideology came “to be called ‘chivalric’”(4). This ideology of “courtesy and chivalric
ideals were nurtured in the conditions of courtly life”—and such courtly literature became
an instrument to “urge” that process of civilization, rather than “reflect[ing] some social
reality”(Jaeger, 9).
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sion against the state or court hierarchy, but also any transgression
against these lateral bonds between knights or against the ideal of
chivalry itself. The boundaries of knighthood and chivalry therefore
depend on (and are threatened by) the strength of these homosocial
bonds. This paper questions and puts pressure on (the imagined stability of) the categories of chivalry, criminality, and “truth” in the
popular romance Amis and Amiloun.
The identical knights Amis and Amiloun, the namesakes for the thirteenth-century medieval English romance Amis and Amiloun, both
swear an exclusive oath of loyalty to one another while serving the
Duke of Lombardy. Amiloun subsequently departs Lombardy for
his own lands while the royal steward is denied his request to join
Amis’s fellowship. The Duke’s daughter Belisaunt proclaims her
love for Amis—and threatens to cry rape if he refuses her advances.
The steward, angered by the knights’ rejection, overhears the lovers and reports them to the Duke. Unable to truthfully swear he did
not sleep with Belisaunt, Amis convinces his brother Amiloun to
fight the steward in the judicial battle in his stead. But by swearing
innocence and killing the steward, Amiloun perjures himself—for
which God punishes him with leprosy for his dishonest impersonation, his wife rejects him for killing the “good” steward, and Amis
happily weds Belisaunt.2 Some years later, the homeless and leprous Amiloun arrives at Amis’s court, where an angelic voice informs them that killing Amis’s infants will cure Amiloun’s leprosy.
Amiloun is indeed cured by the blood of the murdered children,
who are later miraculously found alive. Despite the brothers’ infanticide, murder (of Amiloun’s wife and the steward), false swearing,
2 Much of this Middle English romance follows the earlier French Amis et Amiles and the
Latin Vita Amici et Amelii, which casts Amiles as Charlemagne’s seneschal (steward) who
similarly requires his sworn brother Amis to perjure himself in judicial battle by impersonating Amiles and then wedding Belisaunt. Interestingly, the French and Latin texts of the
tradition all have God’s punishment (of leprosy) resulting from Amis’s bigamy, for he marries Belisaunt in his brother’s stead despite already having a wife—the ME text is unique in
linking divine and social punishment to his false oath (swearing innocence in his brother’s
place). The ME poet places the divine warning and illness directly after Amis falsely pledges innocence, and therefore is punished not for marital deceit but for his manipulation of
social or political “trowthe” (Kratins, 350). For more in depth analysis of the Old French
and Middle English texts in the wider context of the Amis tradition, see Ojars Kratins’ “The
Middle English Amis and Amiloun: Chivalric Romance or Secular Hagiography.”
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and prioritization of their oath above communal bonds, the romance
praises their loyalty and rewards the two knights while condemning
the steward as a “traitor.” What are the legal and moral implications
of the romance’s legal multiplicity—which defines the steward, heroes, and the ladies as alternatively “traitorous” and “trewe”?
The poet praises the brotherhood for their “trewth and godhede” and
condemns the steward as “fals” and “ful of felonie,” yet simultaneously calls on us to witness the nameless steward’s moral and political honor during and after the judicial battle.3 Amis did indeed commit the treason of sleeping with Belisaunt, and then deceived the
duke. The narrator acknowledges this crime both within the text and
voiced through other characters by condemning Amis as being in the
“wronge”—and yet the steward’s orthodox fulfillment of his duty is
similarly defined as “felouny.” The steward activates, upholds, and
serves as an instrument of the legal structure, where “lawe” takes
precedence above the personal desires of those in power—contradicting the text’s or hero’s negotiation of power. In fact, both the
steward and the knights are alternately condemned as “traitours”
and “fals men” throughout the tale (847). We are therefore left with
an unstable political framework and a shifting definition of “treason” as the political and social authority of the heroes and the villain
are equally brought under suspicion. The steward’s conflicted characterization underscores the polity’s conflicting systems of justice,
and the ways competition governs the text’s political discourse.
Critical attention on Amis and Amiloun’s ambiguous heroism has
generally split over the brothers’ hagiographic characteristics (seen
in their divine favor despite their infanticide) or chivalry (their amorous adventures)—frequently in relation to how such categorization
influences their fraught morality.4 Leah Haught in particular consid3 Foster, Amis and Amiloun, Robert of Cisyle, and Sir Amadace. All subsequent quotes
will be taken from this edition and cited parenthetically within the text. Lines 2506, 311,
700 and 407 respectively.
4 Leah Haught astutely summarizes critical uncertainty as arising from the text’s articulations of a “variety of competing “trewths”;” as a secular, sacred, personal, social, or moral
consideration Haught, Leah. “In pursuit of “Trewth,” 241. Ken Eckert, Ojars Kratins and
Dean Baldwin, for example, argue the knights sacred absolution overshadows their infanticide and murder. See Baldwin’s “Amis and Amiloun: The Testing of Treuthe.”; Eckert’s
“Amis and Amiloun: A spiritual journey”; and Kratins’ “The Middle English Amis and
Amiloun.” Ralph Hanna, Thorlac Turville-Petre, and Sheila Delaney posit the romance’s
social and amorous concerns signal the text’s chivalric preoccupation, see Hanna’s London
Literature, 1300-1380; Turville-Petre’s Reading Middle English Literature; and Delaney’s
“A,A, and B: Coding Same-Sex Union.”
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ers the effect their exclusivity has on the social community, asserting the protagonists’ adhere “to their private conception of trewth
above not only their other obligations but also the needs and responsibilities of other characters.”5 The lack of a shared legal or political
vocabulary, and the brotherhood’s inviolable exclusivity, challenges
the traditional power structure of a court. The poet’s emphasis on
the steward’s political conventionality, the brothers’ treason, and the
retained problem of the ending infanticide suggests that moral conflict pervades the text’s political and social landscape. The linguistic
slippage between “treweth” and “treson,” as terms that refer to both
specific acts and abstract values, invites competition between dissonant approaches to such values, as R.F. Green and Haught both articulate.6 Rather than assess the “contentious” morality of the poem
(as scholarship has already noted), this essay will consider legal
multiplicity and the effect of the romance’s shifting political center.7
Reading through the steward’s dual treason and fidelity highlights
the text’s ambiguous political economy, offering criminality as a politically motivated charge with considerable socio-political capital.
Beginning with the ambiguity of treason’s parameters, this study
will trace the legal and political ramifications of the steward’s duality. If justice requires and punishes the steward challenging Amis,
how does the legal system function? By establishing the social and
5 Haught, “In pursuit of ‘Trewth’,” 242.
6 I lean on R.F. Green’s articulation of “truth” and “treason” as ambiguous “keywords.”
Green demonstrates that truth and treason “had a far wider range of meanings in the fourteenth century than it does now, and changes in its meaning were proving a source of
potential ambiguity for contemporaries” (207). Haught has similarly noted the “complex
spectrum of competing values” which arise from such various approaches to “truth”—
the MED cites “sixteen different definitions…ranging from ‘fidelity’ and ‘honesty’ to ‘a
promise…oath…or covenant,’ to ‘goodness,’’ a set of beliefs or doctrines’…”(241). The
word’s many possible meanings strips it of any manifest connotation, directing audiences’
attention toward linguistic and ideological slippage and away from consistent or stable
signification”(242). The assumed link between “truth” (as rectitude or honesty) and moral
superiority is clearly undermined by the lack of a stable definition of what that rectitude
ought to look like, but the linguistic link remains nonetheless—as each character’s protestations of their “treweth” demonstrates. Philosophers and historians have also tackled the
problem of “truth,” commenting on the “multiplicity of co-existing truth games”(Weir,
368). The “politics of truth” therefore refers to not only localizing the specific form of
“truth,” but also the power dynamics of those in question. This paper specifically explores
the linguistic slippage and resulting ethical space created between “truth” and “falsity,” or
between “legal” and “criminality/treason.”
7 Haught argues that the “impact of the romance as a whole might best be understood as
contentious rather than as exultant...” “In pursuit of ‘Trewth’,”(244). Haught focuses on the
effect this multiplicity and contentiousness has on trewth or morality within the text. This
essay picks up on this same question, but explores how it provides interpretive purchase on
the romance’s political body.
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political obligation of the steward within the court network, the
text emphasizes his correct performance of his duty, as well as his
unique advocacy of justice. The narrative’s other court figures manipulate policy or display moral failures, which further underscores
the steward’s vision of the polity as a dispersed network. The narrative validates the steward’s disruptive action and fosters multiple
power centers and ongoing conflict.
Rethinking The Traitor
Despite the poem’s condemnation of the “traitorous” steward,
the narrator offers him as an alternative to the protagonists and
a safeguard against improper rule—giving him the voice of the
“ryght” quarrel. Unlike the self-interested desires of the brothers, duke, or Belisaunt, who all disregard socio-political obligations to the community, the steward’s “trecherie” is valorized. “Envie” may be the steward’s motivation, but the poet
allows this envy to be both personally and politically defined.
For thai were so gode and hende,
or the douke was so wele her frende
He hadde therof gret envie (211-3)
The steward’s “gret envie” is a product of the duke’s close friendship
with the “gode and hende” knights above any other courtly bonds.
We are told the duke loved the knights “so wele” that he provided “al
that thai wald” (170), granting them high positions within his court
and supporting them financially. This gives the brothers disproportionate access to power, which the steward is obliged to prevent. The
knights’ love “or” that “the duke was so wele [t]her frende” suggests
both slights equally inspire the steward’s anger. This suggests that
the steward’s request to join Amis’s brotherhood and for the knight
to “be me kende”(358) is motivated by his desire to break apart the
brotherhood (or simply prevent the powerful brotherhood from such
anti-social exclusivity) or to reduce the duke’s favoritism. Even if
his spying is initially inspired by personal jealousy, his actions conform to the legal parameters of his position.
In fact, the steward’s disclosure of Belisaunt’s and Amis’s secret
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union goes beyond his personal envy or political jealousy. The traditional duty of the steward “to protect his overlord’s interests and
property, including the reputation of the duke’s daughter,” is coupled
with his desire to join or dismantle the brotherhood.8 Sheila Delaney
reads his dual desire as introducing “queer” politics and desires into
the heteronormative space of the poem. She argues the emotional
intensity of these scenes suggest that queer desire and jealousy for
Amis’s love (and resentment at his rejection) trigger the steward’s
spying—allowing for a queer reading of other scenes as well. While
some critics read the brothers’ oath to one another as hinting at a
sexual union, the steward’s “resentment” demonstrates that sexual
politics have become purely political. The text does not clarify what
form the steward’s “envy” or anger takes, but the resulting conflict is
cast as political by the involvement of the entire court in the judicial
battle. Sexual politics become politics tout court.
The steward’s envy or bitterness at the unequal treatment was not
abnormal; in fact such favoritism caused major rifts within Edward
II’s and Richard II’s courts in the poet’s and audience’s recent memory.9 Whether this mistrust arose from the brotherhood’s implied
or potential homosexuality or from their influence over the duke,
their favor reflected back on the duke’s political authority. Michael
Hanrahan, quoting Adam of Usk, asserts that allegations of favoritism within court were frequently framed as sexual deviance—which
imagined “’intimacies’ and ‘sodomies’” as crimes of political intimacy, sometimes completely divorced from any sexual or physical acts. Richard II’s marked favoritism for Henry Despenser, for
example, was castigated as a sexual sin that made the king “unfit
for rule.”10 Unequal political intimacy was frequently articulated
in sexual terms. A figure’s sexual practices—sodomy, homosexual8 Delaney, “Coding Same-Sex Union,” 69.
9 Delaney outlines the close similarities between Edward II and Piers Gaveston and the
brotherhood as a critique actively offered by the text. Richard II’s favoritism toward Henry
le Despenser, Michael de la Pole and Robert DeVere was likewise a main factor in the
Merciless Parliament of 1388. Poor negotiation or lack of equality between political actors
was a particularly contentious issue for Richard, but also plagued Edward II, Louis XI of
France, and James III of Scotland. See Delaney for specific details relating to the romance
and Gerald Harriss’s Shaping the Nation for a more general historical critique.
10 Hanrahan, “Seduction and Betrayal”, 235.
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ity, and even extramarital desire—became linked and even defined
through political deviance.11 Unequal “intimacies,” whether political or sexual, caused political tension. The steward’s “envie” cannot
be isolated to purely sexual or social desires, but informs the political sphere as well.
The long delay between the steward’s initial envy and his actions
against the knights similarly reframes his intervention as the proper
stewardship of the court’s interests as he negotiates for the interests
of others. The knights’ “hendness” and favor with the duke might
initially inspire the steward’s desire “to don hem schame,” yet “yeres t[wo]” pass before he acts (215/17). Only after Amis engages in
his secret relation with Belisaunt (a crime even according to Amis
himself) does the steward move against him, and even then his action follows the required parameters of his post by bringing this
news to the duke. If personal envy were the steward’s only motivation, then his two-year abstinence is hard to justify. It is perhaps
also significant that this steward is not alone in his vilification, but
appears in various guises throughout many romances—the churlish
Kay of Arthur’s court is perhaps best known, but vindictive, “traitorous,” and “fals” stewards litter medieval romance, frequently with
little justification—suggesting that this figure’s position and power
within the polity was as source of concern for many texts.12
While the duke takes the steward’s word as proof of Amis’s guilt—
which itself hints at a close affective bond between the two—there
is “no wight [in the court]… durst ben his [Amis] borwe among”
(1096-8). The text is ambiguous, but the court’s reticence in supporting or seconding Amis, who is described as so loved by the
Duke, suggests that either the court fears the steward’s power or
they, like him, resent the brothers’ status. The poet is silent on the
precise justification of the steward’s envy, but the court’s refusal
to “borwe” Amis implies that they back the steward and similarly
11 See Walter Ong and Paul Strohm for more on sexual legitimacy signifying political
legitimacy.
12 Dinah Hazell discusses the ubiquitous “evil steward” while K.S. Whetter refers to the
”wicked steward” trope. Whetter gives Arthur’s steward Kay as an example of the “evil
seneschals” which “are taken to be one of the stock features of medieval literature”(344).
Other medieval romances which feature a central steward, both good and bad, (just to name
a few) are The Squire of Low Degree, King Horn, Guy of Warwick, Sir Orfeo, Marie de
France’s Bisclavret, Chretien de Troyes’ le Chevalier de la Charrette, and Sir Cleges. Sir
Orfeo’s steward is notably “good” in his protection of Orfeo’s throne without self-interest
or malice. More often, however, the steward is a nameless figure derided by the text, such
as Sir Cleges’ stewards who attempt to extort the hero or The Squire of Low Degree’s
Maradose.

Quidditas 39 61

share his envy or concern over Amis’s actions. In a chivalric community, seconding or guaranteeing a fellow knight was common,
which suggests the court’s reluctance has more to it than the steward’s physical “might” but instead implies his honor—and Amis’s
lack. In fact, Robert Bartlett demonstrates that “charges of treason…
or perjury involved not only the imputation of wrong, but also the
implicit accusation of bad faith…for the charge implied that no trust
could be placed in the word of the accused.”13 Even when the “judicial battle” occurred between second parties, the accused’s word
would be suspect, according to Bartlett. Amis’s difficulty finding a
peer to “borwe” for him may be related to the reticence of the accused, but it may also (or instead) suggest a pre-existing prejudice
against Amis—perhaps because of his great love for Amiloun which
excluded the court from their brotherhood, their belief in his liaison
which breaks faith with their lord, or a chivalric or political failing
the poet has not explicitly narrated.
And while the court expresses joy upon Amiloun’s victory, their joy
hints at appreciation of public spectacle rather than a particular love
for Amiloun/Amis:
Alle the lordinges that ther ware,
Litel and michel, lasse and mare,
Ful glad thai were that tide.
The heved opon a spere thai bare (1369-73)
Mounting the steward’s head within the public square and rejoicing
in the knight’s success where stanzas earlier they refused to support
him questions their authentic support for Amis. The lords of the court
might have justified loyalty to Amiloun or hatred of the steward, but
the “litel and michel” of the entire community are also “ful glad.”
The poet’s explicit inclusion of multiple social classes removes the
court or political factions as an interpretive metric for the battle. Instead the steward’s death becomes a spectacle for public consumption divorced from the precise justifications for the conflict.
Larissa Tracy and Elaine Scarry both suggest that depictions of
torture and public executions represent satire, critique, and dissent
13 Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 108.
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against the status quo rather than celebrations of the regime’s stability.14 It is “precisely because the reality of that power is so highly
contestable, the regime so unstable, that [execution and] torture is
being used.”15 The text emphasizes the entire community’s presence
at the judicial combat and the steward’s subsequent beheading, and
turns his head into a symbol of Amis’s (and the Duke’s) power. Yet
this reaction indicates the “fiction of absolute power” more than it
proves the brotherhood’s dominance. In Scarry’s argument, textual
representations of excessive violence and torture are an attempt to
stabilize and secure the “contestable” and unstable nature of power.
Kathryn Royer similarly looks at the English execution narrative to
claim that the absence of blood, as we see in this scene, suggests
the text’s attempt to “dehumanize” the traitor and “remove him”
from the civic and Christian community.16 Depictions of abstract
violence (without the visceral representation of bleeding and blood)
allow the audience to “dehumanize” the victim and distance him
from their civic community. If this is the case, it would not matter
to the audience of Amis’s battle which combatant succeeded—either
man would have been joyously supported while the corpse would
be vilified and removed from their “civic and Christian community”
in order to symbolically support the political body’s strength. Moreover, mounting a head on a spike was specifically reserved for high
traitors (not just petty), so this performance of joy at the spectacle
of the steward’s death is also a politically necessary performance of
loyalty and national identity.
Treason itself is linguistically unstable throughout the text. The
steward’s protest that Amis will be “ataint” by court reminds the
reader of the steward’s legitimacy in the civil courts while also suggesting that Amis is morally “tainted” within the canon courts.17
The steward condemns Amis as a “traitour [and] fals man,” just as
14 Tracy, Torture and Brutality in Medieval Literature.
15 Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain, 27.
16 Royer, The English Execution Narrative 1200-1700, 11.
17 Edward Foster glosses “ataint” (849) in his edition of the text as a civil term relating to
“property and civil freedoms.”
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the text calls the steward the same (848). False “traitour” describes
both the heroes and the villain of the text. Amis tells us the steward
has the “right,” while this upstanding figure tells us the knight is a
“traitour.” The audience is invited to up-end the text’s justice and
social hierarchy here, yet the poet remains steadfast in describing
the steward as “that feloun” and “fals” while Amis is “bold” and
“hend.”18 The juxtaposition of the steward’s right and his accusation of Amis’s “treason,” closely followed by the poet’s accusation
against the steward using these same terms creates a disjunction between the character’s understanding of justice and our own. If the
hero admits his lack of “trueth” but the poet continues to vilify his
judge, political merit and justice become arbitrary.
As Megan Leitch demonstrates, the English had “a constitutional
understanding of treason” codified in the 1352 Statute of Treason,
which “clarified and limited the relevant crimes…for both high and
petty treason” as anything that “compass[ed] or imagin[ed] the death
of the king” or even intended to harm the king’s authority.19 Both
Richard Firth Green and Leitch verify that the “institutional view
of treason” defined it as “the breach or intended breach of a strictly hierarchical loyalty.”20 However, as this steward demonstrates,
identifying treasonous thoughts and activity was much more fraught
than the Statute imagines, and frequently depended on political and
personal motivation. While according to legal statutes, “hierarchical
crimes” were perhaps the most egregious acts of treason, disloyalty,
hypocrisy, and offences against peers (or kin) could also be generally discussed as treason. The steward’s “tresoun and gile” is not
necessarily a hierarchical crime, as Amis is a peer rather than a lord,
but his disclosure to the duke of Amis’s tryst is framed as treason
(407). However, Amis’s amorous relation with Belisaunt, according
to English law, would unquestionably be a hierarchically treasonous
18 Lines 1082 and 1106 describe the steward’s falsity while Amis and Amioun are “hendi”
knights and “bold” in 1108 and 1123.
19 Leitch, Romancing Treason, 22.
20 Richard Firth Green’s A Crisis of Truth, 208 and Leitch’s “Romancing Treason,” 22
respectively. Green defines treason as having “two centers: a personal conception in which
the offense was committed against someone who had good reason to trust the traitor…
and an institutional view of treason according to which it could only be committed against
someone in political authority, particularly the king, his immediate family, or his judicial
officers.” Green proposes that “the [Statutes], by trying to insist that treason should be
defined as any challenge to the king’s sovereignty, found itself in conflict with some deeply
held traditional ideas about the nature of social order.” In effect, “troth” (as plighted oaths
of loyalty) works at odds with the institutional view of treason.
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crime for its transgression against the lord and succession, making
it a more serious offense.
Legal chronicles and critics agree that hierarchical transgressions
were perceived as more serious than other offences, but defining its
boundaries was challenging.21 While the repeated condemnation of
the steward as “fals” because of his “tresoun” suggests the narrator imagines hierarchical crimes as the most egregious, the steward
was in fact within his “jurisdiction” to oversee the “Court of Chivalry” by accusing Amis of treason.22 Historically, stewardship of the
king and his court was “characterized by its close connection with
the king…and its complete subjection to the royal will” even as the
steward retained control over certain judicial matters of the court.
The steward had “special jurisdiction” to oversee legal and domestic complaints within the king’s domain—through the “Marshalsea
court” or “court of the steward and marshal”—which frequently included any “breach of the peace” or threats to “the royal dignity.”23
Not only was the steward obligated through his oath of loyalty to
the duke to report Amis’s dalliance with Belisaunt, his role as judge
over domestic affairs within the “court of the verge” required him
(specifically) to act against the knight. In fact, by the late fourteenth
century, it appears that the royal steward and the Marshalsea court
oversaw inquests of treason more commonly under the domain of
common law courts, such as the partisan nobles of Richard II, and it
was not until centuries later that parliament transferred all “judicial
competence” of treason into the “common law courts.”24
21 Leitch, Romancing Treason, 24.
22 Leitch, Romancing Treason, 22.
23 Beginning in the late thirteenth century, the royal steward had jurisdiction over the
“court of the verge” or “Marshalsea court”—which governed a range of complaints within
the royal court. The distinction between the court of the verge and the Curia Regis is not
entirely clear, but traditionally any “domestic” matters or “breaches to the king’s peace” or
the “royal dignity” within twelve miles of the king’s residence counted as a matter for the
court of the steward (2). Even after the stewardship was stripped of official political powers, his position still exercised significant judicial powers within the king’s court (meaning
that occasionally there is very little to distinguish between his legal authority and political
weight). W.R. Jones, “Court of the Verge.”
24 Jones identifies a grouping of pleas and records from the court of the verge of “inquests
into the treasonable activities of certain nobles, partisans of the late king, Richard II, before
the steward and marshal sitting at Oxford on January 12, 1400.” The nature of the defendants and charges suggest “it was the sort of ‘state trial’ which usually came within the
jurisdiction of the court of the Constable and Marshal.” Finally “an exasperated parliament
abolished it and transferred its judicial competence to the common law courts” in 1849.
Jones, “The Court of the Verge,” 6.
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The steward, then, not only had the potential to control the royal
administration, but also influence what was defined and charged as
treasonous. The jurisdictional role of the steward may be a factor in
his textual vilification—a reflection of contemporary anxiety of his
authority—but it also points towards a more general ambiguity of
jurisdictional authority as partisan or dispersed. Rather than look at
Amis’s steward as a symptom of the fourteenth-century, his liminal
yet vital status to court function in multiple romances (spanning the
thirteenth through sixteenth centuries) suggests a critical intersection between criminal voices and political change—documenting
the gradual dispersal of government authority away from the central
court to a wider (communal) network.
This text’s destabilization of treason’s parameters, by making the
steward both judge and criminal, similarly points towards the multiplication of the political community. The narrator describes the
steward’s desire to “bring hem [Amis] into care” through the thrice
repeated charge of “with tresoun and with gile” (707-8). Leitch
picks up on the literary uses of “treason” in late medieval texts to argue that while it may have a fluid application, it nonetheless carried
a “sense of gravity” well above that of “betray” or “treachery”—
which held less legal and political weight.25 Amis and Amiloun specifically employs the term towards Amis, Amiloun, and the steward
to condemn Amis’s rejection of the steward’s oath, Amiloun’s bedtrick, and the steward’s exposure of Amis’s dalliance. In fact, “traitor” and “treason” appear over 25 times throughout the text—more
than any other condemnation (well above terms such as “treachery”
or “false”). The poet chooses to define most conflicts in the text as
“treasoun” rather than any other legal or cultural category of crime.
One explanation is offered by Paul Strohm, who asserts “treason”
had “become a mobile signifier, available for application and use by
either party,” harnessed by any political actor as an attempt to undermine their opponent or more firmly grasp power themselves.26 Here,
however, the shifting uses of treason result from different speakers.
25 For example, Leitch notes that in the Roman de Tristan Mark is condemned as “cowardly” and “disloyal” while Malory translates the episode to “traytourly and cowardly,”
suggesting the English were particularly attuned to the legal vocabulary of treason as well
as its parameters. Leitch “Romancing Treason,” 26.
26 Strohm’s Politique, 188. Strohm, Wendy Scase and Megan Leitch all comment on “treason” as a “floating signifier” (Scase, 237) or “an anti-principle, a recognized component of
most mid- to late fifteenth-century English political smear campaigns” (Leitch, 29).
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While the steward condemns Amis as “thou traitour [of] unkinde
blod” and Amis calls himself an “ivel traitour” if he accepts Belisaunt, the only accusations of treason made directly by the narrator are against the steward (389/608). The duke claims Amis is a
“traitour stronge” and “vile traitour,” Amis condemns himself and
even calls Amiloun a “traitour” when he mistakes the leper as his
brother’s killer, and the steward explains Amis is “a traitour strong,/
when he with tresoun and with wrong/ thi douhter hath forlain!”27
The steward’s articulation of treason conforms to the Statute’s articulation of a hierarchical offense, and in fact the most frequent
repetitions of “treason” are applied to the one of the knights directly
by a character—frequently by the steward, but also by the duke himself who promises to “the traitour slon”(827). In terms of frequency,
consistency, and law, the brothers are the traitors—yet these accusations are only made by a character and countered by the narrator’s
consistent praise. The only treason defined by the narrator is that
against the steward. The poem therefore sets up a conflict where
fallible characters may hold the knights in contempt but the authority of the poet solely condemns the steward. The audience must
choose between the narrator’s political evaluation and the hero’s.
Treason indeed becomes the “mobile signifier” Strohm outlines, but
the narrator becomes one such fallible “political actor” set against
his characters, rather than an objective speaker. The disjunction between understandings of treason demonstrates that each operates
with different models of the political structure or action and that any
normative principle is subject to negation by a range of political participants. The steward champions legal precedent, the characters articulate self-interest at war with such norms, and the narrator allows
both visions to stand before ultimately condemning precedence.
As the vilified voice of legal precedence, the steward’s “tresoun”
casts him as a scapegoat who nonetheless highlights the failure of
our hero and the system he operates within. Judith Weiss uses Mordred, himself the steward of Arthur’s kingdom, to demonstrate ro27 The duke calls Amis a “traitour stronge” and “vile traitour” on lines 790, 800, 822,
824, and 827. Amis condemns himself a traitor if he “deshonour[s]” his lord (608) and
calls Amiloun a “traitoure” twice when he mistakes the leperous Amiloun for stealing his
brother’s cup (2045/2076). The steward accuses Amis multiple times as a “traitour” for
“tresoun,” of which this quote above is only one example (790-2).
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mance’s willingness to “sometimes allow” the villain “redeeming
features” despite his role as traitor—even while sowing the “seeds
of destruction” within the hero’s “own character.”28 Amis describes
Amis’s “wrong” in the same breath as accusing the steward of
“falshede,” which destabilizes the text’s definition of justice rather
than convincing the reader of either party’s corruption (940/945). If
the steward is “redeemed” by his moral quarrel, which the narrator
and Amiloun’s wife support, then criticizing him “sows seeds” of
distrust (if not “destruction”) not only within Amis’s character, but
in the political and judicial system generally.
Rethinking the Heroes
The steward’s ambiguous treason—which advocates for traditional
justice and the entire political community—is unique within the
text’s political landscape.29 While the “douhti” steward, always “at
crie” for the duke, is castigated as a traitor for threatening the brothers, the romance’s other figures avoid this censure even as they politically and morally fail. Briefly outlining the other central figures’
moral and political failures, the steward’s unique voice for justice
(or at least he negotiation of how the system functions) becomes
pronounced. Not only does the duke abstain from actively governing
his own land, Belisaunt participates in blackmail while each brother
individually and jointly commit crimes against the polity and morality (such as the infanticide which criticism has grappled with).
The steward’s distinctive manipulation of the political network
is pronounced in his ability to “parceive” the lovers’ initial crime
while no one in court suspecsts. Belisaunt “an hundred time…cast
hir sight” onto Amis in full view of the court:
28 Weiss, “Mordred,” 81.
29 We might consider the steward an “anti-hero,” as Neil Cartlidge articulates, where his
“rebellion” rejects the organizing metrics of romance and in fact provides “imaginative
power” and bolsters “the idealization of heroism.” We expect heroes “to be distinguished
from anti-heroes by their ethical virtue, cultural identity, and ultimately success in combat,” yet the steward illustrates the ways Amis and Amiloun fail this structure. Our villain
is effective enough to intimidate the court and reveal Amis’s treason to the duke—which
causes Amis to run and hide in a locked room rather than display “success in combat.” See
Cartlidge’s Heroes and Anti-Heroes.
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Wel fast [the steward] gan hem aspie
Til he wist of her fare
And bi her sight he parceived tho
That gret love was bituix hem to (701-4)
Without overhearing their pledged love, the steward “parceived” the
“sights” exchanged by the lovers in public and accurately intuited
their “gret love.” And while Beliasunt was “casting” these “sights” a
“hundred times” under the very eyes of her father and the court, they
nonetheless failed to “parceive” the couple’s intentions. The steward is unique amongst the court by intuiting this secret knowledge
“withouten les,” which frames his knowledge as both singular and
indisputable while the duke operates with only partial or insufficient
understanding.30
The steward’s greater understanding of courtly negotiation is evident in his demand to hold and participate in the narrative’s judicial
combat after he reveals the lovers:
The steward was michel of might;
In al the court was ther no wight
Sir Amis borwe durst ben.
Bot for the steward was so strong (868-71)
His ability to “aspie” and “parcieve” demonstrate his intellectual
or physical mobility, but his “strength” here also implies his political and physical influence within the court.31 His “might” and
“strength”—which may apply equally to his physical and chivalric
qualities—has a marked effect on the political body. After the trial
by combat has been announced, none within the court are willing to
30 The entire romance is filled by character with only partial or limited understanding.
The Duke recognizes the knights are “brothers” and that their bond is exclusive, yet cannot
recognize the threat this poses to his other courtiers or that their bond may allow them to
circumvent justice: “Were ye bothe went me fro,/ Than schuld me waken al mi wo,/ Mi
joie were went oway.”(271) The duke instead prioritizes his “joie” in their company over
the threat his favouritism will pose to his court. “The levedi loked opon him tho/ Wrothlich
with her eighen tuo,/Sche wend hir lord were wode”(1165-7).
31 The steward’s ability to occupy physical spaces unnoticed, or sneak into these spaces,
allows him to occupy many positions from which to see—which I include as an aspect of
his superior knowledge here. A.C. Spearing makes a similar argument about the source of
the steward Maradose’s power in The Squire of Low Degree in “Secrecy, Listening, and
Telling.”
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“borwe” Amis—simultaneously casting doubt onto Amis and demonstrating the steward’s powerful influence. The steward’s physical
participation in the duel, regardless of the outcome, further illustrates his commitment to the political system.
In contrast to the steward’s quick perception, the duke is surprisingly marginalized. Amis’s transgression, for example, is discovered
and “punished” by the steward on the field while the poet leaves the
duke silent. The steward confronts the duke, asking him to “herken
to mi sawe!. . . Therefore ich aske jugement” (1206/10). Despite
“asking” for judgment, the steward’s imperative “herken!” and
reminder that “it is londes lawe” turns this request into a demand
(1212). His prompt that it is the land’s “lawe” to judge Amis implies
the steward’s (or narrative’s) fear that the duke may be swayed by
favoritism. Law taking precedence over the duke conforms to political ideology, but his silence while the steward is the voice for that
law is surprising. The “fals” steward demands “jugement,” and by
doing so divides the court into factions of support, championing the
“londes law” and justice while the duke is comparatively silent.
We might expect the duke’s second to act as the proxy in the trial;
however, upon the steward’s death the duke’s authority is restricted
to the knight’s amorous future. While before the battle, the duke was
ready to burn his wife and daughter (who acted as guarantors for
Amis), after the duel the poet leaves him silent about the legal outcome. His willingness to “tho levedis take…to bren” when Amis/
Amiloun did not arrive for the combat displays his prioritization of
the law above his familial loyalty—even when the initial crime was
defiling the daughter he was about to burn. Yet after the combat and
the steward’s death, the duke’s legal voice is silent, offering comment on Amis’s amorous desire but eliding the political or judicial
nature of the combat:
Y graunt the ful yare,
For Belisent, that miri may,
Thou hast bought hir ful dere today (1386-8)
Upon determining that “no” defilement happened, the duke offers
the “miri [maiden]” as payment. There is a disconnect here between
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the trial’s terms and the duke’s reward, which the poet glosses over
in favor of the knight’s amorous success, but which nonetheless
remains for the reader. Legal resolution would dictate Amis’s pardon—not a crown—yet the duke’s response entirely occludes legal
justice in favor of personal desires.
Amis similarly admits that conceding to Belisaunt’s love would do
“deshonour” and make him “an ivel traitour”(607-8), but nonetheless returns her favor. We have already discussed the instability or
amplification of “treason” as a personally motivated charge, but
here Amis’s decision to act regardless of this “deshonour” merits
attention. By committing this “dede”—taking Belisaunt’s maidenhead and then compounding this “sinne” by lying about it—Amis
becomes the “ivel traitour” he initially condemns. Furthermore, he
explicitly declares that “yif y do mi lord this wrong,/ With wilde
hors and with strong/ Y schal be drawe also” (643-5). Amis himself
positions his actions as politically problematic against “his lord”
and reminds the reader of the expected punishment—and by specifically contemplating being “drawn” by “wilde hors” he suggests real
experience with treason’s dangers. Yet Amis implicitly accepts this
punishment by committing the “wrong.” While we might sympathize with Amis’s dilemma here—either falsely condemned for rape
or legitimately condemned for doing “mi lord wrong”—he nonetheless accepts Belisaunt’s love, and compounds his passivity by
attempting to displace blame and conscript his brother to fight in his
place. Amis may recognize the parameters of legal and moral action,
but fails to reject the system that forces him into such a dilemma.
In contrast, Belisaunt’s threat to cry rape if Amis refuses her love
is surprisingly aggressive, emphasizing the knights comparative
passivity and the ways sexual politics are intertwined with court
politics. Belisaunt suggests that if he refuses to sleep with her,
then “thou no schust have ben no knight, to gon among maidens
bright”(619-20) which predicates knighthood on sexual aggression
and makes a knight’s value entirely dependent on his sexual desir-
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ability.32 Such value being placed on a knight’s sexual availability
is not unusual in romance, as Launfal’s queen demonstrates in her
accusation that since he “lovyst no woman,” Launfal “were worthy
forlore” (689-90). What is surprising here is Amis’s sexual passivity throughout: his reluctance to accept Belisaunt or find an alternative to her choices of treason or sex and his abstinence towards
Amiloun’s wife. After conscripting Amiloun’s help, Amiloun’s wife
comments on Amis’s passivity—asking “whi farstow so” when he
refuses her sexual advances (1168).33 While the reader is conscious
of the difficult choices Amis faces between Belisaunt’s threat and
the wife’s misdirected desire, the text offers no space for Amis as an
aggressive or authoritative presence.
Belisaunt’s position as politically and socially superior to the knight
reverses the frequent occurrences of male violence in romance (such
as actual rape in Chaucer’s Wife of Bath’s Tale and Sir Gowther and
threatened rape in Sir Isumbras or Guy of Warwick) and allows her
to coerce the knight. She threatens Amis that
Bot yif thou wilt graunt me mi thought…
Y schal torende doun ichon
And say with michel wrong,
With strengthe thou hast me todrawe
Ytake thou schalt be londes lawe
And dempt heighe to hong (632-6)
She not only highlights the sexual violence at play, but also the
“wrong” inherent in their union because of their social inequality.
Belisaunt details the physical ramifications of disobedience, shared
amongst thieves and traitors, and she emphasizes her superior position and privilege which requires the knight “graunt me mi thought.”
It is irrelevant in this scene what the lady desires—the emphasis is in32 As Carolyn Dinshaw convincingly shows, “there is good late medieval evidence that
sexual acts were fundamental to an individual subject’s sense of self and location in larger
cultural structures”(208). Trokhimenko argues in Medieval German literature, clerical
celibacy caused anxiety as it precluded the sexuality which traditionally defined masculine
gender identity. If a cleric’s masculinity is questioned by his inability to pursue or engage
in sex, then masculinity and sex are linked. See Dinshaw’s “A Kiss is Just a Kiss” and
Trokhimenko’s ““Believing that which Cannot be’.”
33 Amiloun’s wife asks why Amis lays a sword between them and refuses her advances,
which implies that Amiloun is usually more sexually open or aggressive than Amis here.
While Amis refuses to sleep with the lady out of faith to his brother, this still reminds the
reader that he did not remain faithful to his lord the duke and that his sexual passivity
seems to be a constant factor.
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stead on the political and physical ramifications if the knight refuses
her order. This is unusual in romance, where the beloved (of either
gender) is more likely to lapse into lovesick melancholy, as Orfeo
does upon the loss of his queen or Troilus for love of Creseyde, than
to threaten their life.34 While the “michel wrong” Belisaunt speaks
of is that of rape, the line “and say with michel wrong” allows the
reader to interpret the “wrong” action is Belisaunt’s speaking (or
crying rape) rather than the fictional rape itself. Like Amis, she is
conscious of her own coercive ploy. “Saying” wrong becomes more
notable than doing wrong, which makes this sexual debate one of
politics (who “says” what, and to whom). The lady demonstrates
skill at manipulating the social hierarchy and political system with
greater aptitude than the brothers.
Amiloun’s wife similarly turns Amis’s sexual hesitation into a political failure, “missay[ing] hir lord” for his false usurpation of Amis’s
place, asserting “with wrong and michel unright thou slough ther a
gentil knight; ywis, it was ivel ydo!” (1489-94). She censures him
for “slough[ing]” the steward with more vigor than she questions
his sexual passivity. Just as Amis recognized the steward’s “right,”
Amiloun’s wife voices the knight’s judicial and political failure
as more problematic than his amorous inconsistency. Rather than
blame her outburst on her “shrewd[ness]” to distract from her legitimate complaint, the text provides space for the reader to support the
validity of her criticism by restricting Amiloun’s reply to “oft times
his honden he wronge” (1570). The lady calls him a “chaitif” or
coward for killing the steward “with wrong,” and Amiloun’s simple
hand-wringing in response seems to support her (1565). The text
again turns sexuality in this scene into a comment on the court’s
political systems.
The political failures of each figure individually pales in comparison
to the textual centrality (and approbation) of the brotherhood. Even
34 Troilus describes his lovesick symptoms as a “wonder maladie” for which he swoons
and “loste his hewe”(419/491) just as Orfeo goes into the forest as a hermit. Both show
the classic symptoms of depression, anxiety, and passivity associates with the melancholy
beloved—rather than aggression or violence. Mary Wack discusses the physical and literary tropes of lovesickness in relation to Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde as an intensely
physical ailment which goes back to Ovid and Petrarchan Sonnets.
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if an individual actor or brother is found wanting, the text imagines their fellowship has the potential to benefit the community. We
are instructed to have “grete joy” for merely beholding “that frely
foode,” and the political body of the court is imagined to prosper or
thrive because of “how feire they were of sight” (56/80). The text
invites the entire community of “pore [and] ryche” to be “blyth”
because of the knight’s beauty and true love for one another. The
poet promises the brothers “the blisse of hevyn” in reward for their
“trewth and her godhead” (2506-7), which imagines their loyal oath
as an instructive lesson for the reader. However, the knights’ bond
is exclusive and frequently at odds with the interests of the larger
community called on to witness the tale. The “pore and riche” who
are asked to celebrate the knights’ beauty find it burdensome, as
they are required to bear the weight of “susten[ing] hem” (119). The
narrative imagines that because of the knights’ beauty, love for one
another, or duke’s “love” for them, they are no longer obligated to
support themselves; instead the court as well as the poor outside
the court must “susten” the idle knights “for ever mo as lordinges proude in pride” (120). Not only must the community maintain
the knights, they must pay to keep them at an elite status. The text
explicitly contemplates this economic structure, denaturalizing the
commoners’ support of the aristocracy, and implicitly critiques the
system’s dysfunction.
Critics have aptly noted the “dangerously antisocial” element of the
knights’ exclusivity, which operates at the cost of the community
and destabilizes traditional moral or political structures, “since it
promotes a highly personalized and apparently unrestricted loyalty
above any and all other responsibility.”35 The brothers’ bond “so powerfully defines these knights that forming other amatory and familial
relationships becomes difficult.”36 While Amis and Amiloun’s oath
35 Haught, “Romancing Treason,” 247. Pugh similarly sees the oath “debasing” larger
social obligation. Pugh uses queer and queering as a term to capture the “disorienting
effect of non-normative identities and their frequent clash with ideological power” over
and above simple “homosexuality.” Pugh argues that the potential homosexuality of the
same-sex oaths implicate the ideological system and links this “eroticism with cultural
disenfranchisement.”(305) In using “queer desires” here, I wish to similarly encompass
the larger implications of nonnormative or anti-social identities. Tison Pugh’s “Satirizing
Queer Brotherhood.”
36 Pugh, “Satirizing Queer Brotherhood,” 288.
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is not unusual within the genre, it nonetheless rejects other structures
of social authority.37 Scholarship on the brotherhood’s exclusivity
centralizes the infanticide and murder of Amiloun’s wife, questioning the portrayal of homosocial bonds within the polity. Building
on such criticism, I argue that by focusing on the steward’s unique
negotiation of personal and public justice, the brotherhood’s threat
to other social structures becomes pronounced. When the steward
asks to “swere ous bothe brotherhed” this does not necessarily negate Amis’s earlier oath to Amiloun, yet Amis nonetheless reacts
with anger that his “truethe” is threatened and curses the steward,
for whom “give y nought a slo” (362/395). While Amis emphasizes
the exclusivity of his bond, the steward brings together personal and
communal structures. He imagines that “bothe” of them may be in
a brotherhood, suggesting that the court may similarly operate with
multiple networks interwoven and supporting one another. Instead,
Amis rejects the steward as worth “nought a slo,” imagining that
socio-political relationships are mutually exclusive and binary—his
bond with Amiloun precludes any productive relation with others,
which includes that of his lord or his children. In the steward’s vision, the court’s multiple desires and factions support and negotiate
with one another while Amis’s vision creates firm boundaries between these factions that must compete against one another.
Their promise “in wele and wo, in wrong and right”(148) notably
usurps the language of the marriage sacrament, which places the
brotherhood above amorous or heterosexual marriage while also
casting the political community as a threat to their union.38 The
knights swear to “frely…hold togider at everi nede” just as the of37 Athleston and Amis and Amiloun both ‘show idealized same-sex friendships,” but King
Horn, Eger and Grime and Guy of Warwick (to name just a few) similarly have knights
who swear fealty and friendship to one another. Eger and Grime is quite similar to Amis
and Amiloun, both by their sworn oath and the ways the brothers switch identities. See
Ford’s “Merry Married Brothers” for details on other romance brotherhood oaths.
38 Marital language of brotherhood’s bond: “Trewer love nas never non”(144); “While
thai might live and stond/ That bothe bi day and bi night,/ In wele and wo, in wrong and
right,/ That thai schuld frely fond/ To hold togider at everi nede,/ In word, in werk, in wille,
in dede,/ Where that thai were in lond,/ Fro that day forward never mo.”(146-54) They
use both present tense (to “hold togider…fro that day”) and future tense (“forward never
mo” and “thei shuld”) which is required of the official sacrament of marriage, as well as
emphasizing that both parties entered into it “frely.” Speaking the words of consent constituted the marriage contract, regardless of written proof or the presence of a priest. The
only aspect missing from the brother’s bond was explicit physical consummation. For a full
articulation of the obligations and regulations of Medieval English marriage, see McSheffrey’s Marriage, Sex and Civic Culture and Ford’s “Merry Married Brothers.”
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ficial sacrament obligated both parties to freely enter into the union
that will endure “sickness and health.” The knight’s union is a mirror of heterosexual (and public) marriage, but it imagines an entirely
private or enclosed space. Shannon McSheffrey tells us that “the
household, the neighborhood, the parish, the ward, the crafts and livery companies, and the court of the mayor and aldermen” all imagined wielding power within and above the marriage sacrament.39 Patriarchal governance over marriage expressed itself through political
structures, social politics and even violence, attesting that marriage
between two people was never divorced from the political community. This brotherhood rejects notions of public power within their
bond, threatening the sacrament’s social nature.
Centralizing Discord
Rather than explicitly condemn the brotherhood’s deviance or Belisaunt’s aggression, the text turns this discord into a problem of stewardship. Yet the steward also gains praise, which suggests he is both
the cause and the solution to the socio-political conflict. Discord
introduces an ambiguity crucial to the story and to the steward. The
instability here comes down to the constantly shifting definition of
treason, or political obligation, and of the dispersed network of the
political body. Moreover, the narrative’s apparent pleasure in vilifying and killing the steward suggests that this conflict is more than
an inherent part of the system; it is a desired component of the court
and narrative structure. While “wicked,” the steward’s political vision follows the genre’s traditional hierarchy of the political body as
one firmly stratified, but ethically obligated to the community below
it. Yet the text goes beyond rejecting his voice to instead celebrate
his death—which suggests that the romance desires his presence
and opens space for the audience to enjoy the brotherhood’s failure,
the steward’s intervention, or political treason more generally. By
desiring the disruptive presence, which rejects categorization and
definition of effective governance or moral action, the text actively
sustains ambiguity and conflict for its reader.
39 McSheffrey, Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture, 13. McSheffrey demonstrates that “the
regulation of marital and sexual relationships…was an important element of civic culture
and political rule in the late medieval City of London” (14).
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In the culminating scene of the brothers’ heroism we are again reminded of their moral and political ambiguity, as they “caught”
with “grete strokes” all the guests (“both grete and smale”) who
attended Amiloun’s wife’s remarriage (2466-9). Regardless of her
villainy or the narrative’s condemnation of it, “al that they there…
both grete and smale” are not similarly culpable of her sin. Amis and
Amiloun nonetheless cut down innocent guests of all classes and
ranks “grete and small” who are unrelated to Amiloun’s exile or the
wife’s bigamy. In the face of such injustice, the poem encompasses
this scene with lines rejoicing in the knight’s “love” and goes so
far as to describe this “bredale” as “glad and blyth”(2470), linking
violence to their—and our—gladness. The reader is invited to applaud the knight’s “victory” and rejoice at their violent punishment
of the lady and her bridegroom just as we are expected to share
the court’s bloodthirsty joy at the steward’s beheading. As the text’s
heroes, we are implicitly encouraged to share “alle the lordinges”
gladness when Amiloun defeats the steward and “heved [his head]
opon a spere” (1373). Regardless of the possible divine sanction on
the brotherhood’s actions, the text allows or even invites the audience to take pleasure in their corrupt actions.
Similarly, we are encouraged to applaud Belisaunt’s successful
threat of rape to obtain Amis’s love. The knight agrees to Belisaunt’s
terms “and so thai plaid in word and dede,/ that he wan hir maidenhead” (766-7). Defining it as “play” rather than sexual sin in which
he “won” her maidenhood resituates their actions as pleasurable
games, where the audience might applaud his victory rather than
lament either the maiden’s coercion or Amis’s disloyalty. The narrator elides Amis’s oppression here by turning him from a “pover
man” who is threatened with improper action on both sides to the
“hende knight” who restores his masculine authority and “riches”
through Belisaunt (755/761). The steward’s presence is cast as the
sinful and problematic component of this scene, as he overhears and
“unskere[s]” her “conseil” (780). Disclosing or betraying council is
primarily reserved for the romance villain, as betraying confidence
is aligned with forfeiting one’s honor. Therefore we are encouraged
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to censure the steward again for betraying confidence and congratulate the “bird bright” for her love, even if it was “won” through
deceit (776).
The narrator offers these scenes of morally ambiguous murder and
lust as critical moments of the brotherhood’s strength by concluding this scene with the knights “in muche joy without stryf” (2494).
There may be a lack of “stryf” between the brothers, but this assertion comes on the heels of a stanza dedicated to the heroes’ violence
and their strife against Amiloun’s wife. Their “joy” is juxtaposed to
the “stryf” they cause all around them. Their “treweth” and narrative power are intrinsically linked to the conflict they cause, which
the audience nonetheless is advised to support. Reading through the
steward’s “treason,” which destabilizes his criminality as an act of
loyalty, asks the audience to fundamentally question the socio-political structure and community—and their position within it.
Maia Farrar is a PhD candidate in Medieval Literature at the University of
Michigan. Her dissertation considers political conflict and judicial ambiguity
in Medieval Romance from the twelfth through sixteenth centuries, but other research interests include the dissemination of court culture in medieval popular
culture and medieval politics.
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